Sir Stafford Cripps with Quaid-e-Azam in 1946

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Cripps escorts the Founder to his car in 1942

Sir Stafford Cripps was Chancellor of the Exchequer with an ambition to be Viceroy of India. This picture was taken in 1942

The Cabinet Mission (1946)

Lord Pethick-Lawrence, Secretary of State for India on February 19, 1946, announced in Parliament that a special mission consisting of three Cabinet ministers, in association with the Viceroy, would proceed to India, in order to hold discussions with the Indian leaders. The three Cabinet ministers would be Pethick Lawrence, Sir Stafford Cripps and A.V. Alexander.

Cripps told the press conference on landing at Karachi on March 23 that the purpose of the mission was "to get machinery set up for framing the constitutional structure in which the Indians will have full control of their destiny and the formation of a new interim government." The Mission arrived in Delhi on March 24 and left on June 29.

Jinnah faced extreme difficulties in the three-month-long grueling negotiations with the Cabinet Mission. The first of these was the continued delicate state of his health. At a critical stage of the negotiations, he went down with bronchitis and ran temperature for ten days. But he never gave up the fight and battled till the end of the negotiations.

Secondly, the Congress was still much stronger than the Muslim League as a party. "They have the best organized -- in fact the only well organized -- political machine; and they command almost unlimited financial support…they can always raise mob passion and mob support…and could undoubtedly bring about a very serious revolt against British rule."-- Mountbatten's "Report on the Last Viceroyalty".

Thirdly, The Congress had several powerful spokesmen, while for the League Jinnah had to carry the entire burden of advocacy single-handedly.

Fourthly, the Mission was biased heavily in favor of the Congress. Secretary of State Pethick-Lawrence and Cripps, the sharpest brains among them, made no secret of their personal friendship for the Congress leaders.

Wavell was much perturbed by Pethick-Lawrence's and Cripps's private contacts with the Congress leaders and the deference they showed to Gandhi.

Finally, Jinnah suffered from the disadvantage that it was the Muslim League, a minority party, which alone demanded Pakistan. The Congress, the smaller minorities and the British Government including the comparatively fair-minded Wavell with whom the final decision lay, were all strongly opposed to the partition of British India.

Quaid-i-Azam the constitutionalist took appropriate steps to strengthen his hand as the spokesman of the Muslim League. He convened a meeting of the Muslim League Working Committee at Delhi (4-6 April 1946) which passed a resolution that "the President alone should meet the Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy. This was immediately followed by an All India Muslim Legislator's Convention. Nearly 500 members of the Provincial and Central Legislatures who had recently been elected on the Muslim League ticket from all parts of India attended it. It was the first gathering of its kind in the history of Indian politics and was called by some "the Muslim Constituent Assembly". In his presidential address, Jinnah said that the Convention would lay down "once and for all in equivocal terms what we stand for".

A resolution passed unanimously by the Convention (the "Delhi Resolution") stated that no formula devised by the British Government for transferring power to the peoples of India would be acceptable to the Muslim nations unless it conformed to the following principles:

That the zones comprising Bengal and Assam in the North-East and the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan in the North-West of India, namely Pakistan, zones where the Muslims are in a dominant majority, be constituted into a sovereign independent State and that an unequivocal undertaking be given to implement the establishment of Pakistan without delay.

The two separate constitution-making bodies be set up by the people of Pakistan and Hindustan for the purpose of framing their respective Constitutions.

That the acceptance of the Muslim League demand of Pakistan and its implementation without delay are the sine qua non for Muslim League cooperation and participation in the formation of an Interim Government at the Center.

That any attempt to impose a Constitution on a united-India basis or to force any interim arrangement at the Center contrary to the Muslim League demand will leave the Muslims no alternative but to resist any such imposition by all possible means for their survival and national existence.

This impressive show of strength, staged in the very city where the members of the Cabinet Mission were quartered, demonstrated to the Mission and to all the others that the 100 million Muslims of India were solidly behind the demand for Pakistan and further that the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah was their undisputed supreme leader.

The Mission began their talks by first informing themselves of the views of the different leaders and parties. When they found the view-points of the League and the Congress irreconcilable, they gave a chance to the parties to come to an agreement between themselves. This included a Conference at Simla (5-12 May), popularly known as the Second Simla Conference, to which the Congress and the League were each asked to nominate four delegates for discussions with one another as well as with the Mission. When it became clear that the parties would not be able to reach a concord, the Mission on May 16, 1946, put forward their own proposals in the form of a Statement.

Azad, the president of the Congress, conferred with the Mission on April 3 and stated that the picture that the Congress had of the form of government in future was that of a Federal Government with fully autonomous provinces with residuary powers vested in the units. Gandhi met the Mission later on the same day. He called Jinnah's Pakistan "a sin" which he, Gandhi, would not commit.

At the outset of his interview with the Mission on April 4 the Quaid was asked to give his reason why he thought Pakistan a must for the future of India.He replied that never in long history these was "any Government of India in the sense of a single government". He went on to explain the irreconcilable social and cultural differences between the Hindus and the Muslims and argued, "You cannot make a nation unless there are essential uniting forces. How are you to put 100 million Muslims together with 250 million people whose way of life is so different? No government can ever work on such a basis and if this is forced upon India it must lead us on to disaster."

The Second Simla Conference having failed to produce an agreed solution, on May 16, the Mission issued it's own statement.

The Cabinet Mission broadcast its plan worldwide from New Delhi on Thursday night, May 16, 1946. It was a last hope for a single Indian union to emerge peacefully in the wake of the British raj. The statement reviewed the "fully independent sovereign state of Pakistan" option, rejecting it for various reasons, among which were that it "would not solve the communal minority problem" but only raise more such problems. The basic form of the constitution recommended was a three-tier scheme with a minimal central union at the top for only foreign affairs, defense and communication, and Provinces at the bottom, which "should be free to form Groups with executive and legislatures," with each group being empowered to "determine the Provincial subjects to be taken in common". After ten years any Province could, by simple majority vote, "call for a reconsideration of the terms of the constitution". Details of the new constitution were to be worked out by an assembly representing "as broad based and accurate" a cross section of the population of India as possible. An elaborate method of assuring representation of all the communities in power structure was outlined with due consideration given to the representation of states as well as provinces.

The Quaid replied on the 19th , asking the Viceroy if the proposals were final or whether they were subject to change or modification, and he also sought some other clarification. The Viceroy promptly furnished the necessary explanations. It seemed as if the Quaid would accept the Viceroy's proposals. The Congress Working Committee met in Delhi on June 25 and by a resolution rejected the proposals, as "Congressmen can never give up the national character of the Congress or accept an artificial and unjust party, or agree to the veto of a communal group." Azad sent a copy of the resolution to the Viceroy and in his covering letter protested against the non-inclusion of a Muslim-Congressman from the Congress quota.

After the Congress stand had become known, the Working Committee of the Muslim League resolved to join the Interim Government, in accordance with the statement of the Viceroy dated 16th June. The interpretation of the Quaid-i-Azam was that if the Congress rejected the proposals, the League accepted them, or vice versa,the Viceroy would go ahead and form the interim Government without including the representatives of the party that decided to stand out. But the interpretation of the Viceroy and the Cabinet Mission was different from that of the Quaid-i-Azam.

It became clear that the protracted negotiations carried out for about three months by the Cabinet Mission did not materialize in a League-Congress understanding, or in the formation of an interim Government. Towards the end of June, the Cabinet Mission left for England, their task unfulfilled.

It had, however not been a complete failure. It was clear to the Indians that the acceptance of the demand for Pakistan would be an integral part of any future settlement of the Indian problem. In the meantime the League and the Congress were getting ready for elections to the Constituent Assembly.

Cripps Mission 1942

The passing of the Pakistan Resolution was a turning point in the history of Indian Muslims; it brought about a qualitative change in their status as a minority in India. By the middle of 1940, the war had brought disaster for the allies, as France fell in June 1940, the British Government made renewed appeals for co-operation to all parties in India. In the middle of 1941, the war situation had become more serious for the allies, the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and America was involved in the war, the initial success of the Japanese armies in South-East Asia brought the war to India's doorstep.

The British under the leadership of the die-hard imperialist Churchill were most reluctant to make any firm commitment regarding Indian independence. Sir Stafford Cripps, who had recently joined the government as Lord Privy Seal and become a member of the War Cabinet and leader of the House of Commons, had decided to proceed to India. Churchill gave the genesis of this new policy, "The crisis in the affairs of India arising out of the Japanese advance has made Britain wish to rally all the forces of Indian life to guard their land from the menace of the invader." The American President Roosevelt urged Churchill to settle matters with India that finally persuaded Churchill to send Cripps to India.

Cripps flew into Karachi on March 22, 1942, and touched down at New Delhi's airport the following day, the "Pakistan Day", the second anniversary of the Lahore resolution that was celebrated in Delhi by a public meeting addressed by Jinnah. During his stay, Cripps met with Maulana Azad, Jinnah , Gandhi and Nehru to discuss the issues regarding India. He met Jinnah on March 25 and explained to Jinnah that he had changed his view about the Muslim League and Pakistan because of the "change in the communal feeling in India and the growth of the Pakistan movement."

Cripps publicly disclosed the contents of the Declaration at a press conference on March 29. The object was "the creation of a new Indian Union which shall constitute a Dominion, associated with the United Kingdom and other Dominions by a common allegiance to the Crown, but equal to them in every respect." The said goal would be achieved in the following manner: immediately after the war, an elected body would be set up to frame a new Constitution for India. Any province of British India not prepared to accept the new Constitution would have the right to retain its present constitutional position. To such non-acceding provinces, his Majesty's Government would be prepared to give the same full status as to the Indian Union.

The proposals brought by Cripps were not received very enthusiastically by any section of Indian opinion. Gandhi and other Congress leaders were against it because they believed that Britain had already lost the war that it had nothing to offer for the future of India and therefore they looked to Japan and other Axis powers who appeared to them to have the key to their future. Hindu chauvinists to whom Pakistan had become a nightmare smelt the germ of the idea of Pakistan, even if it was not the Pakistan of the Muslim League's conception. Jinnah, in his presidential address to the Allahabad session of the League, analyzed the Cripps proposals and expressed the disappointment that their main objective was the creation of a new Indian Union and Pakistan was treated only "as a remote possibility.'

The formal rejection of the Cripps proposals took the form of a Congress Working Committee resolution dated 11 April 1942. The Muslim League too rejected Cripps' proposals by a Working Committee resolution of the same date. It expressed gratification that the possibility of Pakistan was "recognized by implication" but stated that "the only solution of India's constitutional problem is the partition of India into independent zones; and it will therefore be unfair to Muslims to compel them to enter such a constitution-making body whose main object is the creation of a new Indian Union." The Committee concluded that as "the proposals for the future are unacceptable, it will serve no useful purpose to deal further with the question of the immediate arrangements.'

Life in Bombay (1896 to 1910)

Jinnah left London for India in 1896. He decided to go to Bombay after a brief stay in Karachi. He opted for Bombay because it offered scope for the exercise of his legal faculties and ground for his political ambitions. Bombay had the brightest constellation of India’s lawyer-politicians, at that time. Ranade, Badruddin, Tyabji, Gandhi, Tilak, Gokhale, Cowasji, Dadabhoy Naoroji, Bholabhai Desai, Wacha, Nariman and many more renowned men were based in Bombay.

He was enrolled as a barrister in Bombays’ high court on August 24, 1896. He took up lodgings in Room No.110 of Apollo Hotel. Father’s business had suffered serious losses by then, and he could hardly get any brief for a year or so but he never stopped helping the poor and needy, even in his precarious financial position. In a letter to the Times of India, Bombay, the June 10, 1910 issue, he appealed to the well-off section of the Muslim Community in Bombay to aid a Muslim orphanage in the city. He donated a handsome amount to the orphanage at a time when his practice was not even flourishing. By 1900, he was introduced to Bombay’s acting advocate-general, John Molesworth McPherson, and was invited to work with him in his office. But soon he succeeded in crossing all the hurdles to become a leading lawyer of India. He won many famous cases through powerful advocacy and legal logic.

In politics, he admired Dadabhai Naoroji and another brilliant Parsi leader Sir Pherozeshah Mehta. It was Pherozeshah Mehta, who entrusted him to defend him in the famous Caucus Case. Jinnah hit the headlines in this case; it was remarkable how a 62-year-old statesman of the Congress and an eminent lawyer had entrusted his defence to a young Muslim barrister.

Jinnah’s career as a lawyer is full of marvelous legal victories. Either it was the Sapru-Jinnah encounter in Bhopal high court or the famous Bawla murder trial of 1925; a legal case against the great Hindu leader Bal Ganghadhar Tilak or his last case in 1945 where he defended Bishen Lal at Agra; Jinnah always proved to be the most enviably popular counsel.

Sir Stafford Cripps called Jinnah the most accomplished lawyer — outstanding amongst Indian lawyers and a fine constitutionalist. As a fellow barrister of Bombay High Court put it, “he was what God made him, a great leader. He had sixth sense: he could see around corners. That is where his talents lay…he was a very clear thinker…But he drove his points home — points chosen with exquisite selection –show delivery, word by word.”

Joachim Alva said “he cast a spell on the courtroom…head erect, unruffled by the worst circumstances. He has been our boldest advocate.” Jinnah’s most famous legal apprentice M.C. Chagla, the first Indian Muslim to be appointed chief justice of the Bombay High Court said, “What impressed me the most was the lucidity of his thought and expression. There were no obscure spots or ambiguities about what Jinnah had to tell the court. He was straight and forthright, and always left a strong impression whether his case was intrinsically good or bad. I remember sometimes at a conference he would tell the solicitor that his case was hopeless, but when he went to the court he fought like a tiger, and almost made me believe that he had changed his opinion. Whenever I talked to him afterwards about it, he would say that it was the duty of an advocate, however bad the case might be, to do the best for his client”. He reminisced that Jinnah’s ‘presentation of a case’ was nothing less than a piece of art.”

Jinnah appeared in the annual session of the All India Congress, Calcutta, 1906. Dadabhai Naoroji presided over the session with Jinnah serving as his secretary. In his speech Dadabhai called the partition of Bengal a “bad blunder for England” and addressed the growing distance between the Hindus and the Muslims in the aftermath of partition. He called for a thorough political union among the Indian people of all creeds and classes. “The thorough union, therefore, of all the people for their emancipation is an absolute necessity…They must sink or swim together. Without this union, all efforts will be vain.”

Jinnah reiterated this call for national unity at every political meeting he attended in those years, and he emerged as true Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity. He met India’s poetess Sarojini Naidu at that Calcutta Congress, who was instantly captivated by the stunning appearance and rare temperament of India’s rising lawyer and upcoming politician.